#合约诈骗与虚假网站 Seeing the ZEROBASE case, the old saying still holds true—the pitfalls in the blockchain space are always repeatedly dug.

300,000 USDT was scammed on BSC, seemingly due to front-end imitation, but deeper down it reflects a well-verified pattern: user authorization is always the most vulnerable link. Remember the smart contract scams of 2017? The tactics were almost identical, just with smaller transaction volumes back then and less public attention. Now technology has advanced, but the tricks haven't changed—phishing pages, fake contracts, tricking users into granting permissions, and then the funds vanish into black money pools.

The most ironic part is that all of this is traceable. ZEROBASE's user base probably isn't new, yet hundreds of addresses still fell for it, with the largest single loss being $123,000. What does this tell us? Even seasoned market participants, after market baptism, can have their security awareness compromised by urgent trading desires. The EOS airdrop phishing, Uniswap clone contract scams—all fundamentally follow this logic—create a sense of realism, amplify urgency, and then harvest.

I've seen too many project teams launch "authorization detection mechanisms" afterward, earnestly urging users to revoke risky permissions via revoke.cash. But only a few actually do it. Most users forget these lessons when the next wave of new projects hits.

This isn't about blaming ZEROBASE; it's about a deeper cyclical dilemma: the more prosperous the market, the more sophisticated the scams; the greedier the users, the higher the proportion of victims. I've seen Mt.Gox in 2013, the ICO bubble in 2017, and now the peak of contract scams during the DeFi wave. Ten years have passed—hardware has upgraded, but scammers' creativity hasn't really evolved.

The only thing we can do is remember these cases each time and treat them as tuition fees. Losing $250,000 is painful, but for the entire ecosystem, such transparent exposure is actually the best vaccine.