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The US and UK besiege the BCH group, Singapore family office involved in the "Money Laundering Storm".
In October 2025, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly filed lawsuits and imposed sanctions against Chen Zhi, the chairman of the Cambodian BCH Group, revealing the largest cross-border Money Laundering network in Southeast Asia. The case uncovered a hidden aspect of Singapore's “family office paradise”—Chen Zhi, using the Singapore family office DW Capital as the hub, facilitated fund laundering and image cleaning through family offices and shell companies, referred to by U.S. media as “Singapore washing.”
As a result, this case has also become a “stress test” for Singapore's financial system, exposing the “double-edged effect” of the regulatory vacuum in Singapore's family offices and the high level of trust. Now, Singapore is accelerating the repair of its system, speeding up approvals, and strengthening due diligence, seeking a new balance between “attracting real capital” and “rejecting gray funds.”
Cross-Border Crackdown: Southeast Asia's Largest Scam Network
On October 14, the United States and the United Kingdom acted in concert to sue and sanction Chen Zhih, the chairman of the Cambodian BCH Group, accusing him of leading a cross-border “pig-butchering” investment scam and money laundering network. This is the largest joint crackdown by the two countries to date against cybercrime in Southeast Asia.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has placed the “Prince Group TCO” and 146 related individuals and entities on its sanctions list; the Eastern District of New York prosecutors have charged Chen Zhi with “conspiracy to commit telecom fraud” and “conspiracy to commit Money Laundering.” The U.S. Department of Justice seized 127,271 Bitcoins (approximately $15 billion, or estimated based on the exchange rate/market price at the time), setting a record for the largest civil forfeiture in history.
According to the prosecution documents, Prince Group is ostensibly engaged in real estate, banking, hotels and watchmaking, but in fact operates a fraud park that relies on human trafficking and forced labor. The park has been described as a “prison with barbed wire”, where thousands of trafficked workers are forced to engage in online fraud.
Chen Zhi
According to the information, Chen Zhi was born in Fujian, China in 1987. He moved to Cambodia around 2011, obtaining citizenship through a donation of $250,000 and was granted the honorary title “Neak Oknha”. He also holds passports from Cyprus and Vanuatu. Taking advantage of the capital influx into the casino industry, he founded the BCH Group, expanding its business into real estate, banking, hotels, and watchmaking, becoming one of the most influential private enterprises in Cambodia.
Chen Zhi was charged with five offenses: forced labor and human trafficking, bribery and corruption, corporate Money Laundering, transnational asset transfer and concealment of illicit funds. His funds were used to purchase luxury homes, yachts, private jets, and Picasso paintings. If convicted, he could face up to 40 years in prison.
DW Capital: The Center of the “Money Laundering Machine”
Multiple international media outlets and materials from the U.S. Treasury indicate that Chen Zhi's team uses Singapore as a transit point, leveraging family offices, shell companies, law firms, and academic collaborations to create a “legal facade,” achieving a “dual money laundering” of funds and image. This practice has been referred to by the media as “Singapore washing”—utilizing Singapore's financial credibility and tax system to provide channels and cover for cross-border criminal networks.
The family office's new insights reveal that Chen Zhi and his team’s “money laundering” operations in Singapore are mainly reflected in the following aspects:
First, the family office DW Capital: from wealth tools to “Money Laundering hub.”
In 2018, Chen Zhi established DW Capital Holdings Pte. Ltd. in Singapore, claiming to be a single family office, with a website stating it manages over 60 million SGD and enjoys 13X tax incentives. After the US and UK imposed sanctions on the BCH Group, the Monetary Authority of Singapore announced it is investigating whether the company has violated relevant requirements; as of now, no conclusions or any penalties have been announced.
Multiple media outlets have cited information from the Monetary Authority indicating that DW Capital does not hold a Capital Markets Services (CMS) license. Industry insiders point out that if a family office only manages its own funds, it may operate without a license under existing exemption conditions; at the same time, 13X is a tax incentive rather than a financial regulatory license.
In addition, the media pointed out that Chen Zhi's team has established more than ten “management consulting/holding” companies in Singapore. Reports indicate that among the 17 sanctioned entities registered in Singapore, 14 are registered at the same address 2 Jalan Kilang Barat (Singapore Red Hill) office building, which is viewed by outsiders as a “node for fund circulation and custody.”
Main structure (function):
DW Capital (Family Office entity; claims to be regulated externally)
Skyline Investment Management (Financial Management/Lending Shell, Covering Fund Flow with Auto Loan Business)
Warpcapital Yacht Management, Capital Zone Warehousing (achieving asset transfer through yacht and high-end liquor storage)
Red Mountain Shared Office Space (8th Floor): 14 shell companies are registered here, identified as “Money Laundering activity nodes,” equipped with a cigar bar, KTV, and wine cellar, “seemingly an entrepreneurial base, but in fact a financial bunker.”
Second, “Family Office Trio”: three former front desk operators from Singapore.
All three were listed on the SDN List (asset freeze, U.S. persons prohibited from trading) on October 14, 2025.
Karen Chen Xiuling: CFO of DW Capital, formerly an independent director of 17Live, a listed company affiliated with Temasek, resigned after being sanctioned; responsible for the company's network in Singapore, Mauritius, and Taiwan.
Alan Yeo Sin Huat: CEO of DW Capital (since 2022), originally a financial advisor, and Chen Zhi “wealth manager”.
Deng Wanbao Nabil (Nigel Tang Wan Bao Nabil): Responsible for yacht and storage business, accused of using luxury assets to conceal the flow of funds.
Third, “money laundering hotbed”: asset, social, and institutional gaps.
Mansions and Social Circles: From 2017 to 2022, Chen Zhi purchased luxury properties and assets worth over 40 million SGD in Singapore, including the penthouse apartment at Gramercy Park on Orchard Road (approximately 17 million SGD); and the luxurious suite at Le Nouvel Ardmore (approximately 16.2 million SGD), which has been transformed into a private club with a cigar bar and KTV for business discussions.
He often travels in a black Maybach (license plate “5555”) and frequently hosts parties on the 53-meter yacht “NONNI II” in Sentosa, mingling with diplomats and wealthy individuals. DW Capital has seemingly become a “shadow aristocrat club.”
Funding Flow Paths and Institutional Loopholes: Accounts are opened under the guise of “investment consultants/private equity management” to enjoy family office tax benefits and privacy protection, with funds circulating through shell companies and invested in high-value assets such as real estate/yachts/cryptocurrencies. Scholars summarize it as a standardized practice of “hiding the source of illicit funds by borrowing the high-reputation legal domain.”
Fourth, three “whitewashing chains”: reputation, institutions, and law.
Reputation endorsement: Registering the Prince Foundation (BCH Foundation) in Singapore to shape a “charitable” image in the name of education, healthcare, and corporate social responsibility (CSR projects), diluting external accusations of Money Laundering/fraud.
Institutional Endorsement: Nanyang Technological University (NTU) collaborated with the BCH Group's foundation on short-term education and entrepreneurship projects from 2022 to 2024, which has now been terminated; Temasek subsidiary Surbana Jurong provided master planning for BCH Group subsidiary Canopy Sands' “Ream City” (later renamed “Bay of Light”), with cooperation ending in 2022; CapitaLand's Ascott signed management agreements for two hotels with Canopy Sands in 2024, which were terminated on October 17, 2025, following the announcement of sanctions.
Legal Firewall: The Singapore law firm Duane Morris & Selvam LLP had previously represented the BCH Group in sending a lawyer's letter, threatening media and scholars with defamation lawsuits, but later confirmed the termination of representation.
Tearing Open the Cracks of the “Family Office Paradise”
On October 14, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the UK Foreign Office jointly filed a lawsuit and imposed sanctions against the Cambodian BCH Group and its founder Chen Zhi. Singaporean authorities immediately intervened in the investigation and began cooperating with international law enforcement agencies. Initially, the police only stated that they were “understanding the situation and maintaining contact with foreign counterparts,” but officially opened a case after the U.S. and UK released the sanctions list.
On October 30, the Singapore Police Force (SPF) announced a prohibition order against Chen Zhi Network, sealing approximately 150 million Singapore dollars in assets. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) stated that local banks had submitted suspicious transaction reports and closed related accounts as early as 2024, and are collaborating with the police and international regulatory bodies to review the compliance status of the entities involved.
Multiple American media outlets pointed out that this marks the case's transition from “international sanctions” to the “local law enforcement phase,” which also exposes this “financial center,” known for its “cleanliness,” to the reputational risk of being “shell washed” by multinational fraud groups.
U.S. documents also show that Chen Zhi's network extends to Pacific island nations such as Palau, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.
The BCH group can remain hidden for a long time, and the family office New Intelligence believes this is due to the “regulatory vacuum” of the family office system in Singapore.
Industry analysis points out that Chen Zhi Network regards Singapore as a “reputable jurisdiction,” positioning itself as a “single family office” and establishing a “legal facade” by registering multiple entities at the same address. Meanwhile, they have “moved forward” the core responsibilities of Anti-Money Laundering and Know Your Customer to the banking side—banks review accounts and transactions based on the Monetary Authority of Singapore's Anti-Money Laundering Notice No. 626 and the cross-bank information sharing platform “Anti-Money Laundering Collaboration and Information Sharing System” (COSMIC). If a single family office only manages family-owned funds, it may be exempted from applying for a capital markets services license according to regulations.
In the outer structure, multiple entities such as “Variable Capital Companies”, trusts, and offshore shell companies are layered on top. Although Variable Capital Companies must comply with the Monetary Authority of Singapore's “Variable Capital Companies Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Notice” and are required to engage qualified financial institutions to conduct due diligence, the layering of structures significantly increases the difficulty of “penetrating the actual controllers and sources of funds”, thus providing operational space for “packaging illicit funds as cross-border investments”.
This operational model corroborates the claims made by several media outlets about “using Singapore to shape legitimacy.” As a result, a system originally designed for wealth governance has been transformed into a “legal facade.” The BCH Group is precisely leveraging these loopholes to create a complete set of “legal clothing”: enjoying tax benefits under the guise of family offices, laundering assets through luxury homes and yachts, shaping its image through charitable collaborations, and suppressing the media with lawyer letters, all while beautifying its image with narratives of “responsibility, heritage, and sustainability.”
A financial advisor pointed out: “The more trusted the market, the easier it is to launder money, because no one suspects.”
MAS subsequently stated that Singapore would not tolerate the use of family office systems for illegal activities, “Financial integrity is the core of the nation's foundation.” As of 2025, the number of local family offices has exceeded 2,000, but the BCH Group case reveals that behind the influx of wealth lies a “dual test” of regulation and trust.
**Where will the “pendulum” lean?
The BCH Group case has prompted the world to reevaluate: Is Singapore unbalanced between “financial attractiveness” and “risk prevention”?
Family Office New Intelligence believes that as Asia's most trusted wealth and family office center, this city-state must now find a new balance between “attracting quality capital” and “preventing Money Laundering.”
Just before the incident - on September 29, Singapore's Minister for National Development Desmond Lee proposed at the Global Family Office (GFO) Summit to expedite family office approvals, optimize tax benefits, and regulatory cooperation mechanisms to attract more high-net-worth families to settle in Singapore. The authorities hope to consolidate Singapore's position as a “global family office hub” through a friendly system. However, the BCH Group case erupted in October, putting this policy direction to a rapid reality test.
In fact, the tightening of regulations in Singapore has already begun. Since 2023, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has successively launched the Single Family Office (SFO) regulatory framework, revised the 13O/13U tax incentive provisions, strengthened the anti-money laundering requirements for Variable Capital Companies (VCC), and will launch the interbank information sharing platform COSMIC in 2024 to identify suspicious customers and transactions across banks.
During the same period, ACRA upgraded the Register of Registrable Controllers (RORC), requiring companies to update their beneficial owner information within two days after establishment or changes, tightening the space for “shell family offices.”
The BCH Group case has become a “stress test” for Singapore's institutional reform. The United States and the United Kingdom have accused Chen Zhi of using a Singapore family office and shell companies to launder money, triggering international public opinion to question whether this “family office paradise” is becoming a safe haven for cross-border crime.
In the past two years, Singapore has seen several major money laundering cases, including the “2023 Singapore S$3 billion major money laundering case” and the recent BCH Group incident. These cases have shown a pattern where family offices, offshore companies, and luxury assets (such as mansions, yachts, and jewelry) are used as fund transfer stations.
Striking a balance between attracting wealth and preventing abuse has become the most challenging issue for Singapore: “tightening too much” may weaken its appeal to ultra-high-net-worth families, causing capital to flow to competing centers like Dubai and Hong Kong; “loosening too much” could be exploited by transnational criminal groups, undermining financial credibility.
The Monetary Authority is implementing “differentiated regulation” — on one hand, speeding up approvals threefold (shortening from 6 months to about 2 months), while retaining 13X tax benefits and business conveniences; on the other hand, strengthening verification of funding sources, penetrating reviews of actual controllers, and independent custody requirements, as well as planning to establish a regulatory data platform for family offices to track fund flows and risk accounts. Industry insiders believe that Singapore is attempting to build a more sophisticated firewall between “openness” and “control.”
As pointed out in the article “Chinese Tycoons 'Flee' Singapore, Returning to Hong Kong?” by Family Office New Intelligence: “With increasing regulation and rising reputational risks, some funds seeking anonymity and low disclosure are withdrawing, while family offices genuinely pursuing long-term legacy and transparent governance choose to stay.” Market analysts believe that the family office ecosystem in Singapore is shifting from “quantity expansion” to “quality selection.”
This time, the BCH Group case reminds Singapore once again that the criteria for measuring the strength of a financial center are no longer just capital flow, but whether it can uphold the bottom line of integrity and transparency.